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Spuilzie today 
 
Craig Anderson 
Lecturer in Law, The Robert Gordon University 
 
The doctrine of spuilzie was discussed in the recent case Calor Gas Ltd v 
Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd [2008] CSOH 13, 2008 SLT 123. The writer 
considers the implications of this case, and asks whether spuilzie still has 
a place in the law. 
 
The action for spuilzie is, perhaps, not as well known as it once was. 
However, it occasionally resurfaces in the courts. Calor Gas Ltd v Express 
Fuels (Scotland) Ltd [2008] CSOH 13, 2008 SLT 123, is such a case. 
However, it is not always well understood, with confusion over its nature 
creeping into many accounts. It is very common for accounts of spuilzie to 
proceed on the basis that it is designed to protect the interest of an owner 
of property (see, e.g. Thomson, Delictual Liability (3rd edn, 2004), p 5). 
As we shall see, this is a misunderstanding of the nature of spuilzie. No 
better is confusion between possession and the right to possession (see 
e.g. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (2nd edn, 1981), p. 1005, 
defining spuilzie as “any act in relation to the goods which denies the 
complainer’s title to own or possess them”). Possession and the right to 
possession are quite different concepts, and one may possess without 
having any right to possess. 
 
Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd 
 
The case concerned a dispute between a supplier and a retailer of 
liquefied petroleum gas, or LPG, supplied in cylinders. The pursuers, Calor 
Gas Ltd (“Calor”) were the market leaders in the supply of LPG. The 
defenders, Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd and D Jamieson & Son Ltd, were 
related companies, operated as a single business, which had previously 
been a retailer of Calor’s LPG. In common with other such retailers, the 
defenders had entered into an agreement with Calor. In terms of this 
agreement, firstly, the defenders were only to purchase and sell Calor’s 
LPG. Secondly, after the termination of the contract, the defender was 
prohibited from handling Calor’s LPG cylinders. This meant that the 
defenders could not exchange empty Calor cylinders for cylinders 
containing a competitor’s LPG, with the result that customers with Calor 
cylinders would be likely to buy replacement LPG from a Calor dealer, 
which was permitted to handle Calor cylinders. The purpose of the term, 
therefore, was to preserve Calor’s dominance of the market by making it 
more difficult for dealers to switch to other suppliers. 
 
The agreement was terminated in 2004. In fact, notwithstanding the 
prohibition in the agreement, the defenders continued to handle Calor 
cylinders. Calor sought to enforce the prohibition.  
 
For the most part, the case concerned competition law, the defenders 
arguing that the prohibition was contrary to art 81(1) of the Treaty of 
Rome. However, the pursuers also put forward an alternative argument 
based on spuilzie. To understand why the argument was rejected by the 
Lord Ordinary, it is necessary to consider the nature of spuilzie. 
 
The right of possession 
 
The basis of spuilzie is possession. As Stair says, the pursuer in an action 
for spuilzie “needs no other title but possession” (Stair, Inst. 1,9,17). The 
starting point for any discussion of spuilzie, therefore, has to be the 
concept of possession. 
 
Possession is "the holding of property by ourselves, or by others for our 
use", and requires “an act of the body, which is detention and holding: 
and an act of the mind, which is the inclination or affection to make use of 
the thing detained” (Stair, Inst. 2,1,17). This possession can be exercised 
through another, in which case it is called “civil possession”, in contrast to 
a possessor holding personally, who is called a “natural possessor”. 
However, one who holds entirely on another's behalf, as in the case of an 
employee, is not a possessor (Stair, Inst. 2,1,17).  
 
It is true that Erskine adopts a slightly different formulation of “the 
detention of a subject, with an animus or design in the detainer of holding 
it as his own property” (Inst. 2,1,20), appearing to require the intention 
to hold as owner (animus domini). However, Stair’s account appears more 
consistent with the early authorities (see e.g. Wishart v Laird of Arbuthnot 
(1573) Mor 3605, Bruce v Bruce (1628) Mor 3609). In any case, Erskine 
subsequently qualifies his initial definition by allowing that one could 
possess on the basis of a subordinate real right (Inst. 2,1,22). The vital 
point to note about possession, however, is that one can possess without 
in fact having any right to possess. 
 
Protection of possession: spuilzie 
 
The importance of possession lies in the fact that it is a right. A possessor 
is therefore entitled to protect his position. A possessor who is 
dispossessed is entitled to be restored to possession pending resolution of 
the question of who has the right to possess (Erskine, Inst. 4,1,15). 
Damages, in the form of violent profits, may also be payable. 
 
Dispossession of a possessor without consent or order of law is known as 
spuilzie. In the case of heritable property, the terms ejection and intrusion 
are sometimes used, the latter referring to the case where possession is 
taken from one possessing animo solo (i.e. one maintaining possession by 
intention alone, rather than through physical presence). Usage is not 
consistent, however, and the same principle applies to both types of 
property. 
 
The decision in Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd: 
spuilzie 
 
The pursuers argued, then, that the defenders had committed spuilzie by 
taking possession of the canisters in breach of the agreement, and 
therefore unlawfully. They were, therefore, as the argument was 
summarised by the Lord Ordinary (at para [51]), “guilty of deliberate 
unauthorised possession of the pursuers’ cylinders”. 
 
It should be apparent that this discloses a misunderstanding of spuilzie at 
the outset. Spuilzie protects possession. The point is the wrongful 
dispossession of the pursuer, not the resulting possession of the defender. 
To succeed in an action for spuilzie, the pursuer must show two things. 
The first is that he was in possession. The second is that the defender 
wrongfully dispossessed him. It is not difficult to imagine cases where 
possession is lost through the defender’s actions without the defender 
actually acquiring possession. Thus Stair’s definition, quoted by the Lord 
Ordinary at para [51], of spuilzie as “the taking away of moveables...” 
(Inst. 1,9,16) focuses on the removal of the property from the pursuer’s 
possession. As the Lord Ordinary put it, “unlawful (sometimes called 
‘vitious’) dispossession of the owner is required”. 
 
There would appear to be three reasons why the Lord Ordinary rejected 
the pursuers’ arguments based on spuilzie, which will be considered in 
turn. Before considering these, however, there is one point to note. 
Although it does not affect the outcome of this particular case, it is better 
to avoid possible misunderstanding. This point is the Lord Ordinary’s 
reference to spuilzie as protecting the possession of an “owner”. As has 
been indicated, it is a common misapprehension that only owners are 
entitled to a remedy for spuilzie. Indeed, even Stair describes spuilzie as 
dispossession “without consent of the owner or order of law” (Stair, Inst. 
1,9,16). However, in Stair’s case, this must be taken to be looseness of 
language, for he subsequently makes it clear that only possession is 
required (Stair, Inst. 1,9,17). Indeed, he is clear that it is spuilzie, and 
actionable, for an owner to dispossess without consent or court order 
someone with no right at all to possess (Stair, Inst. 2,1,22). 
 
(i) Possession given voluntarily by someone entitled to possess 
 
The defenders acquired the canisters by means of voluntary delivery from 
the customers, who were lawfully in possession of them. As the Lord 
Ordinary pointed out (at para [53]), “spuilzie does not arise if possession 
is given voluntarily by someone entitled to possess the goods, even if he 
is not the owner”. There is clear authority for this proposition (e.g. Stair, 
Inst. 1,9,20), which, indeed, is understandable if, as Stair says, spuilzie is 
intended to preserve public order (Stair, Inst. 2,1,22). 
 
(ii) Defenders’ intention to return the goods to the pursuers 
 
The Lord Ordinary noted also (at para [53]) that the defenders took 
custody of the canisters solely with the intention of returning them to the 
pursuers. In fact, more could have been made of this point, as it is 
recognised that voluntary restitution within a reasonable time is a defence 
to an action for spuilzie (Bankton, Inst. 1,10,135), at least insofar as it 
concerns liability for violent profits, on which see further below. 
 
It is true that Stair considers that this defence requires restitution within 
twenty-four hours (Stair, Inst. 1,9,23), although Bankton considers the 
question of what constitutes a reasonable time is a matter for the judge’s 
discretion (Bankton, Inst. 1,10,135). However, a person who takes 
possession of another’s property is presumed to do so on their behalf 
(Bankton, Inst. 2,1,27), and so will not disturb their possession. Thus, the 
defenders’ actions would not be considered spuilzie, even without the 
necessity to rely on a specific defence. 
 
(iii) Pursuers not in possession 
 
Although the points covered above would have been sufficient to dispose 
of the arguments based on spuilzie, the Lord Ordinary relied on one 
further ground. This ground was that the pursuers could not succeed as 
they were not in possession of the canisters in any case. 
 
To demonstrate their possession, the pursuers had referred to an article 
by Alan Rodger (as was) called “Spuilzie in the Modern World”, published 
at 1970 SLT (News) 33. This was an article commenting on the Sheriff 
Court case FC Finance Ltd v Brown 1969 SLT (Sh Ct) 41, another case in 
which an attempt was made to apply the doctrine of spuilzie. 
 
The facts of FC Finance Ltd v Brown were, briefly, these. A car was hired 
on a hire purchase agreement. The car was sold by a dealer (who was 
aware of the hire purchase agreement), on behalf of the hirer, to a third 
party in good faith. The buyer therefore acquired good title in terms of 
Part III of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964. The HP company sued the dealer, 
as the hirer was in liquidation by this time. 
 
The HP company argued that the dealer had spuilzied the car. However, 
both the Sheriff-Substitute and the Sheriff held that spuilzie was 
inapplicable, as the HP company was not in possession at the time of the 
hirer’s breach of the HP agreement. In his article, however, Rodger 
demonstrates that the HP company was in possession. As we have seen, 
one can possess through another. This is known as civil possession. A 
familiar example is a landlord, who possesses through the tenant, and 
indeed a landlord is entitled to the remedy provided by spuilzie when his 
tenant is dispossessed (Laird of Durie v Duddingston (1549) Mor 14735). 
A lease is, of course, a form of hire, as is hire purchase. It follows, 
therefore, that the owner of property on hire purchase is entitled to the 
remedy. 
 
The Lord Ordinary in Calor Gas Ltd, however, was not satisfied that the 
same applied in that case. As he said (at para [53]), “[junior counsel for 
the pursuers] did not persuade me that any ability of a hire purchase 
company to possess goods through the hirer could be extended to the 
pursuers in the circumstances of the present case”. 
 
This, however, seems to be incorrect. One possesses civilly when another 
holds, whether wholly or partly, on one’s behalf. This can occur where the 
person with physical custody acts in such a way as to acknowledge the 
civil possessor’s right (see e.g. Earl of Fife’s Trs v Sinclair (1849) 12 D 
223). In such a case, “the detentor holds on behalf of the possessor 
because to do otherwise would be to deny the lawfulness of his own 
detention” (KGC Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996), para 121). 
This appears to reflect the manner in which the customers held the 
pursuers’ canisters, particularly since they acknowledged their obligation 
to return the canisters by returning them to the defenders. Although, as 
has been said, this does not affect the outcome of the present case, it 
would appear at least arguable that the pursuers did possess through the 
customers holding the canisters.  
 
The decision in Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd: 
quantum 
 
The Lord Ordinary also said that, even had spuilzie been established, the 
pursuers would not have been entitled to the remedy they sought, which 
was damages for commercial losses. The Lord Ordinary noted (at para 
[52]) that the reality of the situation was that “the battle was over the 
next contract...That has nothing to do with spuilzie” and (at para [54]) 
that the pursuers were “seeking to protect their commercial interests, not 
the proprietary interest protected by spuilzie”. Indeed, as the Lord 
Ordinary earlier noted (at para [17]), prohibiting the handling of the 
canisters by the defenders was likely to increase the risk to the canisters, 
through theft, abandonment or unsafe use. 
 
This is surely the correct analysis. While spuilzie gives rise to damages, in 
the form of violent profits, these are calculated according to the profits 
that the dispossessed party could have made from the property during the 
period of dispossession (Stair, Inst. 1,9,16 and 1,9,27). These damages 
therefore relate to the property itself, and not to any broader commercial 
interest. 
 
Does spuilzie still have a place in the law? 
 
Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd is not, then, a case of 
spuilzie. The question must be asked, therefore, whether spuilzie still has 
a place in the law. It is true that spuilzie is not widely used as a remedy 
nowadays, and the Scottish Law Commission has previously 
recommended its abolition on the grounds that it is “obsolete and 
superseded by more modern procedures” (Cmnd 5108, 1972, p. 52). It is 
also true that the possessory remedies have declined in practical 
importance, no doubt due to social conditions being more settled and, in 
the case of heritable property, the rise of registration making it easier to 
prove entitlement to possession. Nonetheless, the Commission’s 
recommendation is misguided for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, spuilzie provides the only protection for lawful possession by a 
person without a real right other than possession, such as a hirer or hire 
purchaser. If spuilzie were to be abolished, hirers would have no remedy 
against anyone who dispossessed them of the goods, other than the 
person from whom they hired the goods. This would be the case despite 
the fact that hirers are often functionally in the position of owners of the 
goods, the actual owner being merely a finance company. Such 
arrangements are scarcely unknown in practice. For example, in North 
Scottish Helicopters Ltd v United Technologies Corporation Inc 1988 SLT 
77, a case to which I shall return shortly, under a contract of hire of a 
helicopter, the hirer bore the full risk of any damage to the helicopter. 
Without spuilzie, such a hirer would, in the event for instance of theft of 
the property, have no right to the return of the property from the thief, 
and yet would, depending on the construction of the hire contract, be 
bound to continue paying the hire. Contrary to what the Commission says, 
it is not at all clear that there are any “more modern procedures” 
protecting possession in such circumstances. Although true cases of 
spuilzie are not particularly common, abolition would leave a gap in the 
law. In suitable cases, there is no reason why possessory remedies should 
not be available. 
 
Secondly, there is another group of cases which, though not normally 
classified as examples of spuilzie, appear nonetheless to depend on the 
right of possession. It is, of course, established law that one can not 
normally recover damages in delict for loss arising from damage to 
another's property. For example, in Nacap Ltd v Moffat Plant Ltd 1987 SLT 
221, the pursuers were laying pipes belonging to British Gas. At a time 
when the pursuers were contractually liable for any damage to the pipes, 
the pipes were damaged by the defenders' negligence. It was held in the 
Inner House, reversing the decision of the Lord Ordinary, that the 
defenders were not liable. This is an example of the broader rule that 
there is no entitlement to recover damages in delict for what is often 
termed "pure economic loss". 
 
Nonetheless, there was said in that case (at p 223) that there was an 
exception in cases where the pursuer had a "possessory right or title" to 
the goods. North Scottish Helicopters Ltd v United Technologies 
Corporation Inc 1988 SLT 77 is an example of such a case. In that case, a 
hirer of a helicopter was held entitled to recover for negligently caused 
damage to the helicopter, on the basis of having a "possessory title" to it. 
Such a manner of expressing the issue makes it unclear in which cases 
recovery will be allowed, particularly given that, in Nacap, the Inner 
House persistently refers the pursuers as having been in "possession" of 
the pipes. Nonetheless, there is a clear ground of distinction between the 
two cases. Only in North Scottish Helicopters was the pursuer in 
possession of the damaged property in the long-established sense 
expressed by the definitions referred to earlier. Possession, it will be 
remembered, is a right. This right extends, as Erskine says, to the 
prohibition on anyone “intermeddling” with the goods (Erskine, Inst. 
3,7,16). In North Scottish Helicopters, a remedy was permitted on 
particular facts. In accordance with the well-known maxim ubi remedium, 
ibi ius, where the law affords a remedy, we must seek the right underlying 
it. The right of possession appears to be the only plausible candidate. For 
this reason, the present writer would suggest that North Scottish 
Helicopters is an example of spuilzie, that being the remedy that protects 
the possessor of moveable property. 
 
Viewed this way, one can see that it is seriously misleading to categorise 
cases such as North Scottish Helicopters as examples of recovery for pure 
economic loss. They are not: rather, they are cases where damages are 
recovered for loss caused by interference with a real right. There are, it is 
true, cases where recovery has been denied notwithstanding that the 
pursuer is in possession of the property that has been negligently 
damaged. This is entirely proper, for in many such cases the pursuer will 
have suffered no loss. Blackburn v Sinclair 1984 SLT 368 is such a case. 
In that case, the pursuer had a taxi under a hire purchase agreement. The 
taxi was damaged by the defender's negligence. At the time when the 
case was argued, the pursuer was in dispute with his insurance company 
over whether the insurer was liable to pay for the damage. In these 
circumstances, it was held that the defender was not liable to the pursuer 
for the damage to the taxi, inter alia on the basis that this was loss that 
the pursuer "may in fact never suffer" (at p. 369). Nonetheless, a failure 
properly to recognise the juridical basis on which such cases proceed does 
nothing to promote legal certainty and principled development of the law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article began by considering the treatment of spuilzie in Calor Gas Ltd 
v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd. We have seen that the case was correctly 
decided on spuilzie point. It is difficult to escape the impression that 
counsel for the pursuers did not fully grasp the meaning of spuilzie, which 
is perhaps unsurprising, given the paucity of recent authority on the 
matter. True cases of spuilzie are indeed rare in the modern era. 
However, it is the present author's contention that spuilzie nonetheless 
has a necessary place in the law, and that in appropriate cases there is no 
reason why the remedy should not be used. 
